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ARTICLE 
EMPOWERMENT OR ESTRANGEMENT?: LIBERAL 
FEMINISM'S VISIONS OF THE "PROGRESS" OF MUSLIM 
WOMEN 
By: Cyra Akila Choudhury• 
[I] sn 't it imperative and a little bit obvious that when we speak 
of Afghan women and their rights, we must listen carefully to 
what they themselves have to say about it? As the admirable 
struggles of women of color, particularly in the Global South, 
come to the knowledge of the West, we must remind ourselves 
of the va~idity of their views and hopes, over our perceptions of 
what they should say and do, how they should dress and 
whether or not their oppression stems from being able to have 
an orgasm. 1 
The last decade and a half has seen a burgeoning of transnational activism on behalf of women in the global South. With the 
continuing wars on terror and in Iraq, Muslim women's oppression 
and the role of Islam in that oppression remain in the limelight. 
Academically, it has become a subject of much interest and a recurrent 
theme in the discourse has been how to "help" Muslim women 
progress towards greater liberty and rights. The debate has included 
calls for "multiculturalism" and tolerance for Muslims in the West, for 
monetary aid, and also for diplomatic and sometimes armed 
intervention. Though the concern may be well-intentioned, there is an 
expectation that Muslims, particularly women, will eventually value 
the same rights and social orderings as those of their benefactors in the 
West. Yet when Muslim women consistently articulate a different 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University. This article has benefited 
greatly from the rich conversations with and insights of Aya Gruber and Lama Abu-Odeh as 
well as the continuing support of Robin West. Special thanks are due to the organizers and 
participants of the "Can You Hear Us Now" conference at the University of Baltimore, held 
on March 7, 2008. 
1 Sonia Kolhatkar, "Saving" Afghan Women in ZNET, May 09, 2002, available at 
http://www.rawa.org/znet.htm. To extend this quote, I would also add "having an orgasm, 
wearing hijab or not being able to drive a car," which also seem to preoccupy Western 
feminists. 
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VISion for themselves, it is a source of concern and puzzlement that 
can only be resolved through judgments about the "progress" of their 
consciousness, education, and/or experience relative to "Western" 
women. This article seeks to challenge those judgments. To do so, I 
examine the liberal theoretical underpinnings of these scholarly and 
activist projects to reveal how they advance a particular idea of human 
flourishing that seeks to ultimately "reform" or extinguish those life 
forms (including traditional Islam) that do not comport with it. 
In the first section of the article, I examine how liberalism's 
justification for colonialism has become sublimated in liberal (legal) 
feminism, which subconsciously continues traditional liberal political 
theory's judgments about the "East." I suggest that most liberal 
feminists also have a specific idea of women's flourishing that 
prevents it from fully comprehending Muslim women who choose to 
adhere to Islam, which is, in their view, a hopelessly patriarchal and 
gender oppressive religion. 2 Liberal notions of flourishing require 
progress towards a liberal society. As such, "reform" is used to further 
this vision. I argue that liberal feminism also shares this "narrative 
2 Some definitions are required at this stage: when I refer to liberal feminist theorists, I 
am referring primarily to second-wave feminists who share liberalism's political agenda of 
individual autonomy, equal rights, and a commitment to liberal democracy as well as a 
particular view of human flourishing and progress that I discuss in the paper. To some extent, 
the definition is broad enough to capture elements of the third-wave but for the most part, I am 
speaking of the second-wave. Further, I am not constraining this definition to women located 
in the "West" but to all women who share this particular agenda. Second, "Muslim women" 
is a rather broad category and the use of it could be taken as a reduction or essentialism born 
of identity politics. However, I use the term more for simplicity than out of a belief that all 
Muslim women share some essential characteristic. In my discussion of Muslim women's 
groups, I include secularist groups like Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association 
("RAW A") as well as the religious pietist women because what I am trying to get at is a world 
view that exists outside of Liberalism. Even though secularism itself is a product of Liberal 
thought, Muslim women's secularist groups live in contexts where secularism coexists and is 
shaped by culture and religion in ways that, to some extent, place them outside of Liberalism. 
Finally, when I refer to International Human Rights (IHR), I am referring to the universal 
norms that underlie IHR law and the pressure to reform local norms to reflect them. However, 
I do not mean to suggest that there is no overlap or that the human rights conventions do not 
reflect the aims of women in the third world. What I will suggest is that what is understood 
by inequality or discrimination, the rights that are struggled for are heavily mediated by local 
considerations including culture and religion, neither of which are essential or monolithic. I 
would suggest that because culture is not monolithic, claims that certain cultures clash with 
human rights because of some essential incompatibility ought to be examined very critically. 
I should also make clear that I do not subscribe to the notion of a discreet East/West or 
North/South. It is clear that the West contains a large population that could be considered 
"Eastern" and that the global South is no longer "people over there" but often live side by side 
with their affluent "Northern" neighbors in urban ghettos and banlieues. As such my 
references to third-world women, women of the global South and women in the East should 
be read not geographically but politically and economically. 
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progress" that reduces non-liberal societies to "developing" and, 
consequently, global southern women to victims. 
Yet, many women in the global South reject this characterization of 
their existence. In the second part of the article, I offer some examples 
of Muslim women's visions of flourishing that show both overlap with 
liberal values and, more importantly, divergence. I propose that 
Muslim women's adherence to religion must be accepted as legitimate 
expressions of flourishing even if we, as Western feminists, are 
skeptical about the freedom of their choice. I urge feminists who have 
continued to be extremely incredulous about Muslim women's choices 
to live according to Islam, to re-evaluate and see these women as 
exerting power in their own lives. 3 
Unfortunately, such reconsideration is complicated by the fact that 
there are strategic benefits to ignoring Muslim women's agency. Both 
women's organizations in the Muslim world and Western organizations 
capitalize on women's suffering, the former to gain support from 
resource-rich first world organizations and the latter to mobilize their 
constituents. Yet the costs of such strategic representations remained 
under-examined. In the third part of the article, I use the interaction of 
the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association ("RA WA") and the 
Feminist Majority Foundation ("FMF") to highlight how 
representations of powerlessness of Muslim women and the 
reinforcement of liberal expectations about Muslim women resulted in 
the estrangement between these two organizations. 
Finally, the article considers some of the side-effects of liberal 
feminist transnational work: the alliances with the state as an apparatus 
to pressure the global South to progress and the alliance with 
international law and calls for intervention in the south on behalf of 
women. I argue that liberal second-wave feminists and human rights 
hawk feminists should carefully consider how seemingly benign 
armed intervention can be linked with and traced from the liberal 
"imperative to progress" and the therapeutic violence of colonial 
interventions. Given that liberal theory has justified colonial 
subordination through a discourse of progress, feminism ought to be 
3 Indeed, we ought to be skeptical about the freedom of our own choices despite the fact 
that we "feel" free. Skepticism about Muslim women's choices, particularly when they 
choose modes of being that seem to constrain freedom, prevents us from a relativist extreme 
that makes all choices of equal value. On the other hand, skepticism about our own choices 
and modes of being prevents us from mistaking our position as objective or somehow 
inherently superior. Resolving the dilemma between agency and victimization is no easy task, 
and this article does not explore it in depth. See Robin West, Law's Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 385, 392 (2005). 
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wary of any liberal legal system that seeks to perpetuate that 
subordination. For most women in the South, liberation through 
interventions that have adverse impacts on their social arrangements 
and their families may not be worth the price. 
I. LIDERAL CONTINUITIES: THE LIDERALISM OF FEMINIST 
THOUGHT AND THE NARRATIVE OF PROGRESS 
The purpose of this section of the article is not simply to claim that 
imperial feminism is, in a tautology, colonial. Rather, it is to examine 
why liberal feminisms, even those that claim to be anti-imperial, might 
in reality be more imperial than they admit. I argue that historically 
liberalism has justified the subordination of those whose lives and 
values, social arrangements and institutions were utterly alien. Liberal 
feminism, which can claim at least a partial ancestry from theorists 
like Mill and Locke, therefore, are prone to the same critique as 
liberalism when it comes to alien women. The result is a theory that in 
some measure supports the "progress" of these other "developing" 
women towards values and arrangements that reflect liberal society. 
First, it is worthwhile to consider liberalism's relationship to 
empire. In his work, Liberalism and Empire, Uday Singh Mehta raises 
the question: What happened when a political thought, self-
consciously universal in its scope, was confronted with the 
unfamiliarity of the life forms in the British Empire?4 A summary 
answer to this question, at the risk of oversimplifying a complex 
historical interaction and process, is that liberalism understood the 
unfamiliar as the underdeveloped or the infantile. Putting all the 
cultures on a single evolutionary trajectory, liberalism in its colonial 
period understood the colonized to be progressing towards civilization 
defined by Europe. One responsibility of the conscientious imperialist 
then was to advance that progress, although it seems unlikely that any 
of the colonized societies would ever progress enoufh to reach the 
point of civilization that would allow them self-rule. In any event, 
while the telos was a liberal society with the necessary social 
arrangements, the technique that was then used to achieve it was both 
social and legal reform. In India, during British rule, this lead to the 
codification of the laws and to the import of British liberal legal norms 
and laws to replace the domestic systems that were in effect. British 
4 See UDA Y SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
BRJTISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 82-87, 90-94 (1999). 
5 See id. 
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law was more efficient and more just in the eyes of the colonial 
administrators while native laws were hopelessly arbitrary and 
confusing. Certainly the view was that the imported laws were more 
progressive for many minorities and women despite the fact that these 
improvements were resisted by a large number of Indians. 6 As Mehta 
notes: 
History and progress are an unremitting preoccupation of nineteenth-
century British Liberalism. Yet the political vision that governed that 
liberalism was, as it were, already firmly universal. Philosophically there is 
a dilemma here. Either the validity of that political vision could not be 
swayed by historical considerations or the liberal agenda was in some 
central way directed at the "reform" and modification of the various 
histories it encountered, so as to make them conform to the universalistic 
vision. Because if the particularities and trajectories of the histories and 
lives to which the empire exposed liberals did not somehow already align 
themselves with that vision, then either that vision had to be acknowledged 
as limited in its reach or those recalcitrant and deviant histories had to be 
realigned to comport with it. Liberals consistently opted for the latter-that 
is to say, "reform" was indeed central to the liberal agenda and mind-set. 
To that end they deployed a particular conception of what really constituted 
history along with a particular conception of what counted as progress. 7 
To what extent then is this also the account of liberal feminism with 
regard to women in the global South? Are the liberal women's rights 
activists that seek to rearrange the "deviant histories" of Asian, 
African and Islamic peoples engaged in the same project as the liberal 
scholars who provided the philosophical justification for colonial 
empires? After all, is not the end to which liberal feminism aspires a 
society that resembles and has all the hallmarks of their own societies? 
Insofar as liberal feminists desire other women to have a society that 
affords women equal rights (that we now understand go beyond formal 
equality), that allow women equal opportunities, and representation in 
government, and that free them from gender violence. These are 
laudable goals that are imagined to be shared by women all over the 
world. 8 But in order for that goal to be reached, progress must be 
made by reconfiguring not just the relationship between men and 
women and between women and the state but to reform culture or 
religion in a way that comports with liberal notions of history and 
progress. For most liberal feminists whose view of women's lives in 
6 See generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender 
Justice, and Muslim Personal Law Reform in India, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. I (2008). 
7 Mehta, supra note 4, at 77. 
8 See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER 0KIN, Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua 
Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1999). 
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the global South as thoroughly interwoven with violence justified by 
culture, this is an unmitigated good. Judged from the Archimedean 
point of liberal feminism, how can change towards liberalism be 
anything but good when women are merely subjects of a patriarchal 
religion or culture and live in abject misery? The following quote 
illustrates the point: 
It is by no means clear, then from a feminist point of view, that minority 
group rights are part of the solution. They may well exacerbate the 
problem. In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of 
a less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of 
self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a clear 
interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much better off if the 
culture into which they were born were either to become extinct ... or, 
preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of 
women-at least to the degree to which this value is upheld in the majority 
culture.9 
Although the author's sentiment is expressed in the context of 
minority cultures in a liberal majority society, the assimilationist view 
and indeed the very explicit comfort with the alteration or extinction 
of another culture, that in her judgment does not measure up, is an 
example of the kind of imperative to progress Mehta interrogates. 
Here the yardstick that is used to judge the relative value of "other" 
cultures is both liberal and feminist. 
Another example of liberal feminism's "imperative to progress" is 
the same author's response to the assertion that the veil does not have 
a singular significance for Muslim women: "[S]urely to be unable to 
go out and practice one's profession without being enshrouded from 
head to toe is not, on the whole, an empowering situation in which to 
live, unless it is a temporary transition to greater freedom." 10 In one 
sentence, she makes explicit liberalism's judgments and the progress it 
seeks. Living without the veil is greater freedom. A veiled woman is 
by the very fact that she wears a veil oppressed. In order to be free, 
the veiled woman must progress out of the veil. Such reductionism 
9 !d. at 22-23 (emphasis added). 
10 !d. at 124 (emphasis added). I am certain that the charge that my critique encourages 
"cultural relativism" will be leveled as a defense of Liberalism. 1 have two thoughts about 
this. First, that cultural relativism as a reason not to consider the internal views of those who 
differ presupposes that "our" view is fixed and correct. If all views are co-evolving and no 
culture is essential, then the charge of relativism seems to lose traction. Second, if we take 
cultures to be inessential and evolving as well as interacting with other cultures, then we can 
find internal critiques and dissents that are grounds for coalitions in an ever-shrinking world 
without the need to hegemonically export liberal norms under the guise of universal truth 
through the vehicle of international law because we consider them to be superior--even if and 
when we do consider them to be superior. 
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imagines veiled Muslim women as being nothing more than victims of 
their circumstances. For the author, it seems impossible that veiling 
could have a religious significance other than sexual control or that it 
could be "chosen." 
II. OUTSIDE LIBERAL PROGRESS: MUSLIM WOMEN'S 
DESIRES 
In the post 9/11 United States, images of oppressed Muslim women 
are a commonplace. It would not be overstating it to say that Muslim 
women are considered some of the most oppressed women in the 
world by most Americans. Typically, references to the veil, female 
circumcision, honor killings, gang rape, and restrictions on movement 
all bear the hallmarks of a singular "Islamic culture." Religion rather 
than liberating women, or helping them actualize themselves, is used 
to justify such subordination and compounds their oppression at the 
hands of Muslim men. In general, neither culture nor religion is seen 
as internally heterogeneous, contested and fluid. 11 Interestingly, this 
view of religion (and culture) as being largely unchanging is shared by 
both highly traditional Muslims who argue that no part of Islamic law 
is contingent on interpretation and location as well as traditional 
liberal feminists who construe religions as unchangingly patriarchal -
both views essentialize some part of religion to make their arguments 
for or against it. 12 
In her article, Piercing the Veil, Madhavi Sunder argues the 
problem with this construction of religion is not with religion itself but 
with liberalism, which places religion in the private sphere and prefers 
to leave it alone rather than engaging it as have many Muslims. 13 By 
not engaging in the internal debates about religion in liberal societies 
and ignoring the debates in non-liberal societies, liberals maintain the 
fiction that the interiority of religion is a fixed landscape. By not 
sufficiently accounting for the changes in religion that would become 
apparent through such engagement and by casting the debates as being 
about civil liberty issues such as freedom of religion or separation 
11 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women's Human Rights and Cultural 
Difference, in DECENTERING THE CENTER: PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL, 
POSTCOLONIAL, AND FEMINIST WORLD 26 (Uma Narayan & Sandra Harding eds., 2000). In 
her article, Okin seems not to appreciate that the women in the third world who are the 
subjects of her concern are also participants in culture and religion not just victims of it. She 
notes that there are feminists who are working on oppression but they are rarely internal to the 
society when they are their work is only seen as resistance to, but never participation in, 
culture or religion. See id. at 40-41. 
12 See, e.g., supra note 6. 
13 Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1402-05 (2003). 
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issues, that is, the separation of religion from the public/state, the 
fiction that religion's place is in the private or indeed that it keeps to 
such a private sphere is similarly maintained. I agree with Sunder that 
limiting one's view in this manner prevents one from understanding 
the importance of relifion in the everyday public life of those living in 
non-liberal societies. 1 
Liberalism cannot do the work of explaining why women value 
religion except through judgments about these women as being either 
ignorant or having a sense of false consciousness. 15 Neither of these is 
appealing from the point of view of many Muslim women. After 
centuries of interaction with the "West" and the ongoing attempts to 
reform "developing" societies into liberal ones, the tenaciousness of 
religion must be quite a puzzle. I suggest that in order to fully 
understand why women value religion, one must set aside liberal 
judgments. Muslim women's priorities and their commitments to 
religion ought to be considered seriously and not simply as a pre-
modem remnant that will eventually fall away or be relegated to a 
private sphere. This is important because the reality of women's lives 
in Islamic societies indicates that no such development is occurring 
and in fact a rise in religiosity, as Olivier Roy arwes, is a result of 
modernity and not at all a vestige of pre-modernity. 6 
Roy's point is underscored by a survey of Muslim women done in 
2005 by The Gallup Organization. The survey revealed that Muslim 
women did not view themselves as particularly oppressed, that they 
did not feel conditioned to accept second-class status evidenced by the 
belief that they ought to have an unfettered right to vote, to work 
outside the home and to serve in the highest levels of government. 17 
Yet, they also did not share typically liberal feminist concerns about 
gender arrangements; they did not see sex issues as a priority and 
placed violent extremism, economic and political corruption and lack 
of unity among Muslim nations over concerns about the hijab, which 
was never even mentioned by the respondents. 18 When asked to 
identify the best aspect of their own societies, an overwhelming 
majority of women cited attachment to their spiritual and moral 
14 !d. at 1402-04. 
15 See generally Mehta, supra note 4. 
16 See OLIVIER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 148-97 
(2004). 
17 Dalia Mogahed, Perspectives of Women in the Muslim World, GALLUP WORLD POLL 
SPECIAL REPORT: THE MUSLIM WORLD 1 (2006), available at http://media.gallup.com/ 
WorldPoll/PDF/GALLUP+MUSLIM+STUDIES _Perspectives+of+Women _11.1 0.06 _FINAL 
.pdf. . 
18 /d. at 3. 
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values. 19 What is remarkable about this data is that women clearly 
articulate the desire for certain (liberal?) rights while valuing their own 
(non-liberal) religions and cultures. 
Examples of this very "modem" hybrid sensibility can be found 
among even rural women. In an interview published in Islamica 
magazine, Mukhtar Mai, the now famous Pakistani survivor of a 
tribally-sanctioned gang rape, repeatedly asserts the value of her 
religion and its role in providing the strength to stand up for justice. 20 
She challenges the view that Islam supported the violence done to her 
and discusses the way she was treated at the hands of the state. At the 
same time, she levels a class critique of her treatment at the hands of 
the state and it is clear that she considers herself to have the right to 
redress. 21 Indeed, Islam is being contested but also lived in ways that 
are more fluid and controversial than we see in most representations or 
expectations. 22 For instance, Muslim women in Egypt are divided in 
their support for secularism and their adherence to Islamic norms. The 
mosque movement in Egypt and the increasing number of women who 
are attempting to learn about Islam and live its norms faithfully are 
challenging and are challenged by domestic secular feminisms. 23 Yet 
Islamic women's activism has taken root and is gaining ground, as 
Margot Badran claims: 
It is important to note that Islamic feminism is the creation of women and 
men for whom religion is important in their daily lives and who are troubled 
by inequalities and injustices perpetrated in the name of religion. Islamic 
feminism continues to spread because it is relevant. It is engaged and 
enlightened. It is also controversial and unsettling. 24 
19 !d. at 2. 
20 Fareeha Khan, Interview with Mukhtaran Mai, 15 lSLAMICA MAGAZINE (2006), 
available at http:/ /www.is' lamicamagazine.com/issue-15/interview-with-mukhtaran-mai.html. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST 
SUBJECT 2-6, 15-16 (2005). 
24 Margot Badran, Islamic Feminism Revisited, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://www.countercurrents.org/gen-badran100206.htm. While I would be wary of collapsing 
all Muslim women's activism under the rubric of "feminism," which has historical and 
philosophical particularities that may not translate to certain Muslim women's activism, this 
quote can be read broadly to apply to all women's gender activism except perhaps those that 
simply reinforce the dominant patriarchal norms. See also Elizabeth Warnock Femea, Islamic 
Feminism Finds a Different Voice: The Muslim Women's Movement is Discovering its Roots 
in Islam, Not in Imitating Western Feminists, 77 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 24,29-31 (2000) 
(arguing that by women giving Komaic texts new interpretations, women are gaining greater 
gender justice). But cf Val Moghadam, Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Notes on a 
Debate, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, available at http://www.iran-bulletin.org/womenl 
lslamic_feminism_IB.htrnl (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) (arguing what has been achieved 
162 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 39.2 
The fact that women continue to value religion and culture cannot 
be reductively explained as a product of ignorance or brainwashing. 25 
These examples do not signify a simple story of oppression and 
resistance or blind adherence to religion, but a complex reality in 
which religion plays a much more multifaceted role, where it coexists 
with the demand for rights that overlap with liberalism but may not 
come from a liberal understanding of self or society. To acknowledge 
this alternative view is not to say that Muslim women do not live in 
systemic patriarchy, that Islam is not patriarchal, and that gender 
subordination sometimes reflected in "traditional" arrangements ought 
not to be challenged. Rather, it is to say that opinions about how it is 
challenged, by whom, and what priorities are established can 
legitimately differ among women and are mediated by local contexts. 
It is also to acknowledge that Islam is not fixed and can be interpreted 
in a number of ways and that religion must be engaged by feminists if 
they seriously seek to support the full liberation and flourishing of 
women in the Muslim world. 26 
III. REPRESENTING MUSLIM WOMEN: REAPING 
ESTRANGEMENT FROM DISEMPOWERMENT 
The co-presence of these seemingly conflicting commitments to 
religion and to rights may tempt scholars to reconcile them through 
liberal notions of progress towards modernity. Certainly, that has been 
the dominant interpretation. However, to do so misapprehends the 
project of women's groups in Islamic societies, which do not follow 
such a linear temporal progression from religion to "liberty from 
religion." Muslim women who want both the vote and the hijab do not 
see a conflict between the two or the desire for the latter as less 
"evolved." However, this double consciousness is little understood by 
well-intentioned women's groups in the West. 
Partnerships that are based on such different visions of women's 
flourishing, then may lead to estrangement and disempowerment for 
women's organization in the Muslim societies. Yet, Muslim women's 
groups have themselves sometimes strategically deployed 
constructions of victimization expected by liberals to gamer much 
needed support. In other words, Muslim women's organizations may 
through the interpretation of Islamic texts is limited in content and consequence, because 
interpretation ofthe texts is ultimately left to the ruling religious elites, which may dismiss the 
feminist interpretations). 
25 See MAHMOOD, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
26 See Sunder, supra note 13, at 1433-34, 1456-57, 1463. 
2009] Empowerment or Estrangement? 163 
cater to the expectation of victimization externally while internally 
focusing on the strength of local women. This suggests that they do 
not see themselves as victims but as agents in shaping their realities. 
On the other hand, the exportation of a victim narrative can give rise to 
a one-dimensional view on the part of Western partner organizations 
that is then disseminated within Western societies. A case that 
illustrates the pitfalls of such coalitional work based on differing views 
of the "victim" would be the RA WA's experience with the FMF. 
While both sides came together in good faith, their interaction 
highlights the difficulties that attend transnational projects. 
RAW A has become very well known in the recent decade for its 
work to advance women's rights and in bringing attention to the 
atrocities committed by the warring factions in Afghanistan. During 
the 1980s, RA WA's main strategy to gain global support for its 
projects was disseminating visual representations of the oppression of 
Afghan women.Z7 These images were exported to the world, printed 
in newspapers and shown on television, as part of a campaign to raise 
awareness and get monetary support. While it is clear that Afghan 
women were indeed living under brutal conditions, these 
representations standing alone deeply reinscribed the prevailing 
stereotype of powerlessness and victimization that the world had come 
to accept about most Muslim women. The strategy worked because it 
shocked most viewers and gave first world feminists a transnational 
cause with a palpable urgency to support. 
While RAW A exported an account of oppression externally, its 
internal strategy was markedly different. They published a newsletter 
Payam-e-Zan that contained editorials and commentary and 
inspirational materials encouraging women to redress their own 
problems. RA WA built schools and hospitals and instituted social 
programs combating fundamentalism even as they were pushed to the 
borders of Pakistan during a decade of increasing violence within the 
state. Thus, on one hand, RAW A was attempting to help women in 
Afghanistan through reinforcing a self-perception of empowerment 
and self-help, a self-perception that RAW A shared as an organization. 
While on the other hand, the external picture that brought them 
support from the West was one of abject powerlessness and brutal 
. 28 
oppressiOn. 
27 See Amy Farrell & Patrice McDermott, Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of 
Human Rights Discourse for Transnational Feminism, in JUST ADVOCACY? WOMEN'S HUMAN 
RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISMS, AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 33, 37-39 
(Wendy S. Hesford & Wendy Kozol eds., 2005). 
28 See id. at 39-40. 
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In 1997, RAW A partnered with the FMF in its Campaign to End 
Gender Apartheid. This was seen as a positive development by 
RA WA. Undoubtedly, it benefited FMF and the women's movement 
in the United States; some scholars have suggested that such a project 
reinvigorated the lagging support for feminist organizations by 
domestic women. Part of the reason for that decrease in domestic 
support is the achievement of substantial legal and social victories for 
feminists leading to greater access to education and the workplace and, 
therefore, greater economic freedom. There was no urgency to the 
other battles being fought in the United States, but helpless "sisters" in 
other countries were languishing in their cultural prisons. Where that 
prison became a torture chamber like in Afghanistan, domestic United 
States feminists quickly mobilized on their behalf, just as many citizens 
mobilize around disasters. Unfortunately, FMF's own representations 
of Afghan women soon put them at odds with RAW A. FMF used the 
same strategy of showing powerlessness and oppression to gain public 
support but without adequately recognizing or acknowledging the long 
and hard-fought struggle that RA WA had engaged in, which presented 
quite the opposite picture. 29 
For instance, the shocking video clip of the burqa clad woman 
being executed that was filmed by RAW A in the late 1990s, but did 
not appear in Western media until after 9/11, was shown over and over 
again to underscore the helplessness of Afghan women. Sonia 
Kolhatkar, the vice president of the Afghan Women's Mission, 
underscores this point: 
Far more interested in portraying Afghan women as mute creatures covered 
from head to toe, the Feminist Majority aggressively promotes itself and it's 
[sic] campaign by selling small squares of mesh cloth, similar to the mesh 
through which Afghan women can look outside when wearing the 
traditional Afghan burqa. The post card on which the swatch of mesh is 
sold says, "Wear a symbol of remembrance for Afghan women," as if they 
are already extinct. An alternative could have been "Celebrate the 
Resistance of Afghan Women" with a pin of a hand folded into a fist, to 
acknowledge the very real struggle that Afghan women wage every day, 
particularly the women of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of 
Afghanistan (RAW A), who are at the forefront of that struggle. 
Interestingly enough, 50% of all proceeds go toward helping Feminist 
Majority in promoting their campaign on "Gender Apartheid" in 
Afghanistan. 
On almost every image of Afghan women in the Western mainstream and 
even alternative media, images of shapeless blue clad forms of Afghan 
29 See ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, AGAINST EMPIRE: fEMINISMS, RACISM, AND THE WEST 167 
(2004). 
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women covered with the burqa . . . . We all know and understand the 
reactions which the image of the burqa brings, particularly to Western 
women and feminists. That horror mixed with fear and ugly fascination like 
knowing the site of a bloody car wreck will make you want to retch but you 
do it anyway. Whose purpose does this serve? How "effective" would the 
Feminist Majority's campaign be if they made it known that Afghan women 
were actively fighting back and simply needed money and moral support, 
not instructions?30 
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In a letter to Ms. Magazine, RA WA challenged FMF's 
representation of Afghan women and accused it ofbeing a hegemonic, 
corporate feminist group that failed to acknowledge the twenty-five 
years of work done by RAW A in Afghanistan and also to account for 
its support of groups like the Northern Alliance that had actively 
oppressed women while in power. 31 
In substantial part, these images and this representation were co-
opted for political use. Indeed, just as RA WA's representations were 
easily put to work to mobilize women in the United States, FMF's 
advocacy and rhetoric did similar double duty by providing the Bush 
administration a ready source of material to justify intervention in 
Afghanistan. RA WA's accusation that FMF was a collaborator with 
the administration was not altogether unjust: one of FMF's 
achievements in its campaign was its involvement in shaping U.S. 
foreign policy in Afghanistan and its acquiescence to the support for 
the Northern Alliance by the administration. Although, the support of 
a misogynistic political group and the involvement in foreign policy 
by a partner organization angered RAWA, it is clear that RAWA's 
chief resentment was the cooptation of its work and its authority to 
represent Afghan women. 32 
Both RA WA and FMF's representational strategies had undesired 
and unintended consequences and resulted in their ultimate 
estrangement. This interaction evidences the dangers that arise when 
women's organizations from the West and South enter into a 
partnership based on a very narrow understanding of women's agency 
and women's flourishing. Clearly, RA WA exported the images that 
were "expected" from a place like Afghanistan. To tum Kolhatkar's 
question around: What would have happened had RAW A begun with 
a campaign that highlighted the agency of Afghan women and clearly 
stated that they only needed monetary support? By performing the 
roles that liberalism assigned them, RAW A perhaps inadvertently 
30 SEE KOLHATKAR, SUPRA NOTE 1. 
31 See Farrell & McDermott, supra note 27, at 43. 
32 See id. at 42-43. 
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reinforced the narrative of progress. It is not surprising that FMF, 
being a liberal feminist organization, strategically used the dominant 
images of victimization of Afghan women as proof of the necessity to 
reform the society. It is likely that RA WA's images provided the very 
evidence needed by the telos of a society arranged according to liberal 
values and was the only way to secure the liberation of millions of 
otherwise oppressed women. 
RA WA and FMF each spoke the language of women's human 
rights but it seems as though neither fully comprehended each other's 
aims. The bitter parting of ways that resulted did not lead FMF to 
abandon its work on behalf of Afghan women. Rather, in the 1990s 
and 2000s, women's groups including FMF began to work on a 
number of transnational projects expanding their international scope. 
One of the consequences of greater engagement in transnational work 
was the engagement with the state and with international law as 
partners in exporting progress. 
IV. FEMINIST ALLIANCES WITH THE STATE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LIBERAL IMPERATIVE TO 
PROGRESS AND THERAPEUTIC (COLONIAL) VIOLENCE 
The FMF's alliance with RA WA was well intentioned, though 
perhaps, ultimately it led to estrangement. Yet, the work that FMF 
engaged in on the foreign policy level with the Bush administration 
points to another set of troubling developments in Liberal Feminist 
practice - partnering with Western state powers to achieve liberal 
feminist ends internationalll3 and eroding the sovereignty of "rogue" 
33 See Feminist.com, Talking Points for Your Call, http://www.feminist.com/ 
violence/campaign6.html (last visited October 7, 2008) for an explanation of talking points 
that are given to volunteers urged to call their state representative in support of the 
International Violence Against Women Act. The taking points were developed by Amnesty 
International and disseminated by women's groups. Jd. 
TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL 
• The International Violence Against Women Act (I-VAWA) would coordinate and 
improve U.S. government efforts to stop the global crisis of violence against women and girls, 
if it becomes law. 
• Violence against women destabilizes countries and impedes economic progress and 
stability. 
• Violence against women is a tremendous human rights problem around the world. It 
includes rape, domestic violence, acid burning, dowry deaths, "honor killings," human 
trafficking, female genital cutting and more. Experts estimate that up to one in three women 
will be beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in their lifetimes, with rates reaching 70 
percent in some countries. 
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states. 34 It is the latter which I am concerned with in this section 
because it is most likely to be considered a welcomed change in the 
international order. 
Until recently, the obligations of International Human Rights law 
and consequences of infractions devolved to governments. Individuals 
and social organizations petitioned to their governments for redress 
but had little standing in international institutions. Increasingly, 
human rights instruments have begun to bypass state-level actors to 
give standing to internal non-governmental actors and individuals.35 
The rationale for this development was the number of states in the 
global South that either failed to protect their own citizens from abuses 
or were actively engaged in abuse themselves. Such states could not 
be relied on to report or comply with international legal obligations. 
Thus, it was considered necessary to give voice to those who were 
otherwise kept silent by their own states. Although, this sort of 
standing has given expression to a number of constituencies that 
would otherwise be at the mercy of their state, the erosion of state 
sovereignty in favor of more internationalism comes with costs. 
• 1-VAWA is designed to give victims of violence more assistance, hold perpetrators 
accountable, and support new efforts to change social norms that support or condone 
violence. 
• The legislation would create a jive-year strategy and funding to support the rule of law 
and prevent and respond to violence against women in 10-20 poor to middle income 
countries. It will expand the U.S. Government's ability to address gender-based violence 
issues with foreign governments as part of its diplomatic relations. 
• 1-VA W A integrates efforts to end violence against women and girls into existing, 
appropriate U.S. foreign assistance programs with a special emphasis on supporting the 
overseas women's groups that work each day to stop violence. 
• 1-VA W A enables the U.S. Government to develop a faster and more effective response 
to violence against women in armed conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. 
• Passing 1-A WA is essential if the U.S. is to take a more coordinated and effective 
stand against violence that harms so many women and girls worldwide and will help support 
economic progress and stability in 10-20 poor and middle income countries. Jd. (emphasis 
added). 
The emphasis here is clearly to enable the U.S. to take action on a state level to improve 
the lives of women in "1 0-20 poor to middle income countries." I d. This raises the question 
of what the purported "beneficiaries" of the country feel about the U.S. government's actions 
and the linking of foreign assistance to progress. 
34 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741 (2007) 
(describing the use of state police power to "crack down" on domestic violence perpetrators 
and the resulting adverse consequences born largely by the women who are their partners, 
including hornelessness and financial imrniseration). 
35 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, art. 2, U.N. Doc. NRES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 
1999). 
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First, armed with the ability to access the international arena for 
themselves and using the language of human rights, second-wave 
feminists in both the West and the South have tried to get societies that 
they consider particularly oppressive towards women further along in 
the progress towards "freedom."36 In that effort, they have partnered 
with organizations in the global South. As has been argued above, 
what women's groups believe to be progress in the first world and 
what it is considered to be in the third world may not be equivalent. 
Aside from the basic agreements that violence against women is a bad 
thing, that certain rights are required for human life and dignity to be 
preserved, it is unclear that all constituencies agree about what initially 
causes the conditions in which violence occurs in a society (Western 
feminists often cite "culture") or what the society ought to look like at 
the end of "progress." 
If we continue to promote progress along the liberal trajectory, it is 
quite clear that we may be supporting the end/annihilation/extinction 
of certain ways of life that might enrich those who live them. For 
some, the end of Islam, the end of any culture that does not abide by 
the values of liberalism, is no great loss. These illiberal religions and 
cultures may be "reformed" or made extinct through "forced" progress 
if necessary. Yet, for many women who live communal lives, made 
meaningful by their culture and its values, this progress cuts against 
their own visions of progress. 
Second, a commitment to international human rights has evolved 
into an emerging consensus that human rights violations are grounds for 
military intervention. Progress through humanitarian intervention has 
been supported by some liberal feminists who question why such 
intervention has not come sooner.37 Indeed, humanitarian armed 
intervention is increasingly seen as a necessity and not a last measure 
for preventing violence towards women and children; however, the 
devastating therapeutic violence of intervention itself is obscured and 
decoupled from human rights activism on behalf of third-world 
women. While liberal feminists largely rejected the administration's 
justifications for the Iraq war, they have been vociferous about 
intervention in Darfur. It is an odd contradiction that armed 
intervention that overthrows a despot in one country is decried for 
causing chaos and violence while similar actions are encouraged in 
another as a solution to chaos and violence. It might be argued that 
36 See Feminist.com, supra note 32. 
37 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 38-43 (2006). 
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peacekeepers can hardly be equated with an invading army. This is 
true, but it should be noted that the U.S. military in Iraq is hardly 
fighting the conventional war of invasion and peacekeepers attempting 
to settle conflict may be drawn into warfare, as the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia evidences.38 Further, there is other violence that 
attend intervention. In recent reports, peacekeepers deployed to war-
tom areas have come under scrutiny for sexual exploitation and abuse 
of women and children under their care. 39 This is not to say that 
intervention is always, necessarily wrong and that it should never be 
undertaken on behalf of those who stand to lose their lives. I can 
make no such categorical judgments. However, I do suggest that the 
costs of intervention borne by the people that are supposed to be 
helped by it require greater examination. 
One part of that examination must include the complicity of 
Western states in a global system that exempt themselves from the 
consequences of violating international law; that support violence in 
the South; and prop up regimes that are illegitimate in the eyes of their 
subjects. Indeed, as Zillah Eisenstein observes, "[ m ]any Afghan 
women activists wonder why U.S. women, even progressive ones ... 
are more interested in 'why Afghan men treat women like dirt' rather 
than why Western male-dominated governments foster 'misogynist 
religious extremism at the expense of women's rights. "40 
First world states' willingness to use force in any guise is a 
dangerous development for women from the global South who stand 
to lose their lives, their children, their brothers and sisters, their 
mothers and fathers, and their husbands and loved ones in wars and 
detention camps for what might be a fantasy vision of freedom. That 
first world women are willing to collaborate with the very "patriarchy" 
that they claim to be oppressed by, deploy its weapons, and while 
decrying the cooptation of women's rights rhetoric ought to be 
regarded as an inconsistency that demands redress. 
As Amy Farrell and Patrice McDermott argue: 
Whenever Americans position themselves as saviors, their rhetorical 
devices can then be wielded by conservative forces to legitimate whatever 
kind of horrific policies they choose to enact, particularly when those 
38 See Michael H. Hoffman, Peace-Enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law: 
Emerging Rules for "/nterventiona/ Armed Conflict," 83 7 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 193 (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/englsiteengO.nsflhtml/57JQCY. 
39 See Peacekeepers Abusing Children, BBC, May 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hil7420798.stm; Peacekeepers Sell Arms to Somalis, BBC, May 23, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/7417435.stm. 
40 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 166. 
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policies are wielded against Arab and African countries which we "know" 
to be backward because we have been working to liberate them. These are 
powerful discursive quandaries that progressive feminist organizations in 
the United States face, even if their intentions are good, and even if they are 
run by Third World or Muslim women. 41 
Rather than continuing to mouth hollow pieties about "women's 
rights as human rights," it is imperative now more than ever for first 
world feminists to critically theorize the local and discover how their 
own agendas have been used to further what can only be considered 
imperial power dynamics in the international sphere. I suggest that 
liberal feminists think particularly carefully about the calls for use of 
international intervention to further women's human rights, decoupled 
from local contexts and understood as liberal rights. Such uses of 
power as a means of progress resuscitate a colonial dynamic that is 
fraught with the peril of subjugation and violence towards the very 
people it seeks to liberate. 
Instead, more support for local practices of human rights and 
liberation that are being engaged in by ordinary Muslim women and 
men in the global South in general might be a better way to improve 
lives, even if we disagree with their definitions of liberation and 
human flourishing. This would require us to accept these women as 
fully capable humans and their commitments to their religion and 
culture as valid expressions of "freedom." Critical approaches that 
find agency in various locations and understand power to be exercised 
even by those who have traditionally been considered powerless gives 
us one avenue to do this kind of revising and expanding of our 
understanding of Muslim women. 
The ultimate goal for such acceptance and contextualization is to 
prevent the narrative of progress from dictating a course of action that 
"pressures" illiberal societies towards liberal arrangements because 
that is what "we" want. Further, it calls us to take care that the 
"pressure" that is exerted on behalf of women's rights does not include 
therapeutic violence. This is not to say that intervention will never be 
justified or required; it is to merely warn that intervention in the 
service of Liberal progress ought to be regarded as the first step in a 
resurgence of the tutelary relationship that characterized colonialism. 
41 See Farrell & McDermott, supra note 27, at 51. 
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CONCLUSION: POSSIDLE FUTURE ALLIANCES 
Liberal (legal) feminism as a theoretical enterprise suffers from a 
dubious past insofar as it encompasses and pursues progress along the 
lines of its liberal ancestors. Its future depends upon whether it will 
continue to support the same agenda along a predetermined trajectory 
that will lead all women to a singular end. This view admits only a 
singular progression in history in which the worlds of many 
underdeveloped dystopias have yet to arrive at the Promised Land. On 
the other hand, it can theorize a new vision that does not require such a 
judgment from the "outside." Indeed, whether it creates a space for 
such alternative visions of flourishing, Muslim women and many 
societies in the global South are living such alternatives. There is a 
co-presence of all these competing views of what it means to live a 
good life. If liberal feminists are to understand religious Muslim 
women's activism that seeks both liberal and illiberal rights, this co-
presence has to be allowed to disrupt the meta-narrative of progress. 
In other words, the predicament for liberal feminism, which is by self-
definition a theory and praxis of liberation, is whether to reconcile 
itself with its peculiarly anti-liberation genealogy which informs it 
currently (affirm liberal universalism) or radically reevaluate this 
ancestry to try and reformulate itself in a way that reflects a true 
liberation theory and praxis (takes a break from liberalism).42 
If liberal feminists were able to take such a break, at least from 
universalizing their values and goals, they might be rewarded with a 
greater comprehension of the motivations and values of Muslim 
women who insist on holding on to their religion and culture while 
demanding rights. As I have argued above, Muslims do indeed have 
similar desires but that these desires for a better life, for those who 
believe, include their commitment and adherence to religion and 
represent a very different view of human flourishing. Rather than 
reforming these alternative histories and visions, an approach that 
accepts this plurality would find a valuable and meaningful expression 
of human progress and liberation and impose or require no "reform," 
except those undertaken voluntarily. 
While I think it unnecessary to abandon second-wave feminism's 
many contributions, including the understanding that women in every 
culture live in a gender unequal system, critical theorists can give us a 
more nuanced approach that reveals how even within that system, 
42 See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK 
FROM FEMINISM (2006) (borrowing the idea and the term "taking a break"). 
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women can maneuver and exert power and make choices. It can also 
give us the ability to recognize similar projects undertaken by women 
living in Muslim societies but not mistake these as projects that are the 
same as our own undertaken in our contexts. Moreover, it can make 
obvious the complex and contested nature of the global system 
particularly the role of economic disparity and increasingly 
environmental disparity and the way in which privileged women wield 
power - sometimes to the benefit and sometimes to the detriment of 
other women. Most importantly, it can underscore how the inequality 
in the global system cannot be ignored when engaging state power 
internationally or engaging international institutions for seemingly 
benevolent purposes. Such critical contributions are becoming 
increasingly important as women seek to do transnational work in 
alliances with organizations across the globe. Without taking into 
account both the differing values of women in these locations and the 
nature of the international system, alliances between first and third 
world women may never be made on grounds that seek what is best 
for women in their local context and with respect to alternative visions 
of human flourishing. They will continue to suffer from the 
hegemonic, imperialistic tendencies that are part of the history and 
philosophy of liberalism. It is a sign of hope, then, that some strains 
of feminists are interrogating these tendencies and reinventing a more 
equal gender liberation theory. 
